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“Afghanistan Is Not at War”: The History France’s Far Right Chooses to Ignore

Yaser Abrar

November 7, 2026
Reading Time: 70 mins
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“Afghanistan Is Not at War”: The History France’s Far Right Chooses to Ignore

2/2/1983 President Reagan meeting with Afghan Freedom Fighters in the Oval Office to discuss Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan

In this article, journalist Yaser Abrar revisits historical documents and official positions to examine the historical roots of the Taliban’s emergence within the context of Cold War interventions and geopolitical rivalries; the role of the United States and regional powers in this process; and France’s place in Afghanistan’s developments before and after 2001. He also examines France’s position on the Doha Agreement, the West’s political and moral responsibility for the consequences of the collapse of the Afghan Republic, and the French far right’s approach to Afghan asylum seekers. By connecting these developments to his personal experience of exile, he also explores the question of asylum within its broader historical and political context.

“From the perspective of asylum law, Afghanistan is not a country at war.” This statement was made by Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally (Rassemblement National), during an interview with Franceinfo on October 25, 2023. During the interview, he explicitly stated that he saw no “added value” for French society in accepting Afghan nationals. When the journalist questioned him about women persecuted and mistreated in Afghanistan who were fleeing the Taliban regime, he once again assessed their presence according to its usefulness to French society, invoking the criterion of “added value” without paying the slightest attention to their plight or to the dangers forcing them to leave their country. During the televised election debate on May 5, 2024, he once again asserted that Afghanistan was not a country at war and addressed the question of accepting Afghan refugees according to the same criterion. This is an evaluative framework in which a person fleeing repression is judged according to the supposed usefulness of their presence to the host society, thereby placing the refugee’s legal recognition and human dignity in competition with considerations of social, cultural, and economic utility.

Yet how did Afghanistan, the country its inhabitants are fleeing today, reach this point? What forces contributed, over several decades, to shaping its political, military, and ideological circumstances? How did a movement that now deprives women and girls of their most fundamental human rights, and arrests, tortures, and kills journalists, civil society activists, and opponents, come into being, rise to power, and subsequently regain it? And what responsibilities must the states that once claimed to be present in Afghanistan in the name of freedom, the fight against terrorism, women’s rights, and state-building assume for the consequences of this history? This article seeks to examine these questions in light of the documents, evidence, and historical considerations presented here, approaching them from several different perspectives.

There can be no doubt that any judgment concerning a country’s political and social realities requires recognition of its historical context, as well as all the forces, power relations, and interventions that have contributed to shaping and directing its development. The sequence of wars, foreign interventions, geopolitical alliances, and political failures that displaced millions of people cannot be erased from historical memory, only for the population of that country to be asked to bear the consequences alone. Without acknowledging this historical continuity, the issue of Afghan migration is reduced to an examination of consequences while its causes are obscured.

This issue is rooted in the transformations Afghanistan underwent over the past half-century: a period during which the country became a theatre of rivalry between major powers, Cold War conflicts, and intelligence operations. It subsequently experienced, in the context of organized and armed jihad, the defeat of the Soviet Union, civil wars, the emergence of the Taliban, Western military intervention in the name of combating terrorism, the state-building project, and finally withdrawal and abandonment. This exceptionally costly trajectory was marked by instability and collapse. It is within the framework of this history and its accumulated consequences that the mass emigration of Afghan citizens must be understood.

Afghanistan: From a Cold War Theatre to the Emergence of the Taliban

Today’s Afghanistan, where the Taliban rule by violating the dignity of its population, the lives of women, the future of girls, and the future of all its citizens, is neither an event detached from the past nor the result of a sudden transformation. It is the culmination of a historical process of interventions, rivalries, and decisions made by major powers, whose human and historical cost the Afghan people have paid, and continue to pay, with their lives, livelihoods, and future.

In American political discourse, the “Charlie Wilson’s War” has often been discussed. This expression is also well known among Afghan intellectuals and refers to the financial and military support provided to the Afghan “mujahideen” during their war against the Soviet Union. What part of the American narrative presents as a story of ingenuity and victory in the Cold War marks, in Afghanistan’s history, the beginning of a chain of consequences that spiralled out of control.

Official documents from the US Department of State show that, even before global political discourse reduced Afghanistan to a “terrorism issue,” the country had become a theatre of covert operations during the Cold War. July 3, 1979, represents a decisive moment in this process: in Washington, a confidential decision was made with the authorization of Jimmy Carter, then President of the United States, paving the way for organized support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Years later, this process was also acknowledged with exceptional candour by one of the most senior figures in American foreign policy. During a hearing before the House of Representatives in April 2009, Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, explicitly stated that those whom the United States was fighting at the time—the Taliban—were the very same forces that the United States itself had financed approximately two decades earlier.

She explained that Washington, in coordination with Pakistan’s military intelligence services and army, had recruited mujahideen and brought fighters from Saudi Arabia and other regions to the theatre of war, along with their Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, in order to defeat the Soviet Union and prevent the expansion of its influence in Central Asia. Referring to the consequences of this policy, Clinton acknowledged that the United States was “reaping what it had sown” at the time.

On July 18, 2010, during an interview with Greta Van Susteren of Fox News at the US Embassy in Islamabad, Clinton made this admission even more explicitly. She stated that the United States had helped create a problem against which it was subsequently forced to wage war. She added that Washington had gone to Pakistan, assembled a force of “mujahideen,” armed it with Stinger missiles and other military equipment, and then sent it to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. After the Soviet withdrawal, the United States had declared victory and abandoned Afghanistan and Pakistan to their fate, leaving behind trained, heavily ideologized, and still-armed forces. According to Clinton, those against whom the United States would later fight had received support from that very same country during the anti-Soviet war.

This admission did not come from Washington alone. Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s current Defence Minister, described Pakistan’s participation in the two wars in Afghanistan as a “historical mistake” in an address to his country’s National Assembly on February 9, 2026. He stated that what had been presented in the 1980s as “jihad” was, in reality, not a “war to defend Islam,” but rather a “war serving American interests and intended to secure the support of a superpower.”

According to him, in order to carry out this “US-manufactured jihad,” Pakistan had transformed its education system, historical narrative, and part of its social structure. However, once its mission was accomplished, Washington abandoned it. Despite this, Pakistan once again embarked on the same course after September 11. In a particularly harsh formulation, Asif stated that the United States had used Pakistan for its own purposes and then discarded it “like a piece of toilet paper.” He emphasized that Pakistan would not be able to overcome the consequences of these events until it acknowledged its past mistakes.

These statements obviously do not absolve Pakistan of its historical responsibility. On the contrary, they constitute an admission from within that very power structure and demonstrate that what was presented under the name of “jihad” was constructed within the context of geopolitical rivalries and calculations of power. It was a bargain that devastated Afghanistan, turned Pakistan into fertile ground for extremism, and whose consequences continue to ravage the entire region.

Furthermore, the twelfth volume of the US Department of State’s official series, entitled Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980: Afghanistan, brings together documents concerning Washington’s decision to initiate and implement covert operations in Afghanistan.

Document No. 53 in this collection, entitled “Summary of Conclusions of the Special Coordination Committee Meeting” and dated June 26, 1979, records Washington’s initial decisions concerning covert support for opponents of the Afghan government. According to the document’s fifth footnote, Jimmy Carter, then President of the United States, signed two presidential authorizations on July 3, 1979.

The first authorized the CIA to support the propaganda and psychological operations of the Afghan mujahideen and to provide them, directly or through third countries, with financial assistance and non-military equipment. The second concerned international propaganda operations aimed at portraying the Afghan government of the time and its leaders as a “despotic regime subservient to the Soviet Union,” while providing media coverage for the Afghan mujahideen’s efforts “to regain the country’s sovereignty.”

Document No. 59 in the same collection, entitled “Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency” and dated August 22, 1979, records in detail the initial stages of the implementation of this policy. It specifies that, following Carter’s signing of the two authorizations on July 3, the CIA had begun implementing its covert operations policy in Afghanistan.

The section concerning financial assistance and non-military equipment also indicates that the liaison officer of Pakistan’s intelligence services had agreed in principle to act as an intermediary for delivering CIA assistance to the mujahideen forces. The report nevertheless emphasizes that, at the time it was written, the CIA had not yet asked the Pakistani side to transfer any funds.

Document No. 76 shows that this approach continued several months later with the approval of additional assistance, which was to be channelled primarily through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This was the same triangle that would subsequently play a devastating role in Afghanistan’s fate. The document indicates that American officials wanted to demonstrate to Saudi leaders that they were taking the fight against Soviet influence in Afghanistan seriously.

Document No. 80 specifies that the CIA contacted the intelligence services of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia concerning this same covert operation. Pakistan regarded the tribal insurgency in Afghanistan as a matter of vital importance to its security, while Saudi Arabia had announced its commitment to assisting the Afghan mujahideen. In this document, the head of Saudi intelligence refers to his government’s commitment to supporting the mujahideen and asks the CIA to help identify the most effective groups.

Following the direct entry of the Soviet army, Documents Nos. 107 and 214 show that the programme moved beyond its initial assistance measures to broader support and subsequently to the provision of lethal military equipment to the mujahideen. This process continued with Saudi Arabia’s cooperation and financial participation. Finally, Document No. 267, a US Department of State intelligence memorandum dated May 9, 1980, sets out the programme’s operational mechanism: weapons supplied by the CIA were transported to Pakistan through Saudi Arabia, the Pakistanis were responsible for training, and the operational details were coordinated by the CIA with Pakistan’s intelligence services and General Zia-ul-Haq, then President of the country.

This history is not one of isolated and unrelated decisions. On the contrary, it reveals a network of financial, military, intelligence, and ideological support through which Afghanistan was transformed into an instrument for exhausting a global rival.

The essential point, however, is that the Taliban emerged from the same jihadist networks established during the Cold War. Some of their earliest forces therefore came from the mujahideen who had fought the Soviet army with the covert support of the CIA and Pakistan’s intelligence services.

The Council on Foreign Relations explicitly confirms this assessment, writing that the Taliban were formed from the Afghan mujahideen. According to its account, they were subsequently joined by young Pashtuns educated in religious schools in Pakistan [with financial support from the United States, European governments, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries], who helped form the Taliban movement.

Along the same lines, the US National Counterterrorism Center describes the Taliban as a movement that emerged in the early 1990s, whose initial core consisted of farmers and men who had studied in religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

For its part, the US Congressional Research Service states in its report on the US military withdrawal and the return of the Taliban that, in 1993 and 1994, Afghan Muslim clerics and religious students, primarily of rural and Pashtun origin, established the Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters who had become disillusioned with the civil war between the mujahideen factions; many others had studied in religious schools in Pakistan. The same report specifies that Pakistan supported the Taliban because the group could become a “cooperative ally” of the country, in accordance with what Pakistani officers referred to as “strategic depth.”

This same historical pattern also appears in official French sources. The French Senate’s report on violations of women’s fundamental rights in Afghanistan states that the Taliban were formed in religious schools in Pakistan and benefited, during the 1980s, from funding by Western-bloc powers as part of the struggle against the Soviet Union.

The official record of the French Senate’s public session on November 16, 2009, also indicates that CIA military and financial assistance, Pakistan’s role, the migration of hundreds of thousands of Afghan citizens, the influence of religious schools, and Saudi funding ultimately led to the emergence of a movement that captured Kabul in 1996.

Another report by the US Congressional Research Service, devoted to religious schools, likewise highlights the connection between wartime policy and ideological formation. According to this report, during the 1980s, religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan were strengthened through increased financial support from the United States, European governments, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries. These actors regarded the schools as centres for recruiting and training anti-Soviet fighters.

It was in this context that the Taliban movement emerged in the early 1990s among Afghan clerics and religious students. Many of them were former mujahideen who had studied and received their training in these very same schools. The report adds that several Taliban leaders and Al-Qaeda members had developed their radical political ideas in religious schools in Pakistan.

Taken together, these documents do not constitute a mere footnote to history. They form the backbone of a world in which money, intelligence services, war, migration, extremist schools, and geopolitical calculations converged to prepare the historical ground on which the Taliban took root.

This history is not simply one of “aid and support,” but rather one of using a nation’s geography and destiny in the service of a strategy aimed at exhausting a global rival. Within this equation, Afghanistan represented, for the United States and its Western allies, a battleground against the Soviet Union; for Pakistan, “strategic depth” and a means of expanding its regional networks of influence; and for regional ideological investors, fertile ground for the expansion of religious fundamentalism.

As for the Afghan people, they inherited the gradual erosion of state structures, the collapse of the political and social order, and the disappearance of the possibility of enjoying a stable future.

France Was Not Outside Afghanistan’s History

Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate and unjust to place France, in this game, on the same footing as the United States, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia. I am not claiming that France created the Taliban; such an assertion would be simplistic, imprecise, and unhelpful. But it would be equally mistaken to imagine that France remained outside the history of the Afghan jihad.

In the first weeks following the Soviet intervention, the French government described that intervention as unacceptable and insisted on the “Afghan people’s right to determine their own destiny.” In February 1980, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then President of the French Republic, specified that a solution to the Afghan crisis had to be based on three principles: the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Afghan people’s right to decide their own affairs, and a guarantee that Afghanistan would become neither a theatre of confrontation nor an instrument of rivalry between foreign powers.

In the diplomatic language of the time, this position placed France alongside the war waged by Afghans against the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, doctors, journalists, intellectuals, solidarity networks and, according to French investigative sources, agents of French intelligence services entered the geographical theatre of the war waged by the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army.

Jean-Christophe Notin’s investigative book on the French secret war in Afghanistan, together with the review of this work published by the Revue Défense Nationale, discusses the presence of French organizations, contacts between agents of the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) and jihadist leaders, the training of Afghan mujahideen on French territory, and the special position Ahmad Shah Massoud occupied in the eyes of French intelligence services.

In the Panjshir, the French presence was associated with Massoud’s name from the beginning of the war. Militarily, too, sources concerning Milan missiles report the delivery of anti-tank missiles to Massoud’s fighters in the context of the anti-Soviet war, as well as the presence of French instructors tasked with teaching them how to use these weapons.

Afghanistan thus became the theatre of a game whose ramifications extended from Moscow to Washington and from Paris to Islamabad.

Afghanistan After 2001: The Promise of Values and the Collapse of Responsibility

In my view, however, France’s essential share of moral responsibility does not lie solely in the 1980s. Its responsibility is even greater in the period when, following September 11, the West turned Afghanistan into the official theatre of a military mission, state reconstruction, the promotion of women’s rights and freedom of expression, the organization of elections, the training of the police and army, and the fight against terrorism.

In 2003, NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. France, too, participated in the country’s military and political developments within the framework of this mission. This presence was part of a discourse that presented the strengthening of the Republic, the development of civil society, the guarantee of women’s rights, the establishment of freedom of expression, and the development of independent media as fundamental objectives. My generation believed that Afghanistan’s future depended on the realization of these values.

France was not an “actor detached from realities on the ground” in Afghanistan. Operation Pamir was the name given to the French military presence in the country. French soldiers fought in Afghanistan, were wounded there, and lost their lives there. Official sources from the French Ministry of the Armed Forces report that 89 French soldiers died during operations in Afghanistan. I write this fact with respect, because these very sacrifices demonstrate that Afghanistan was not, for France, a distant and insignificant periphery.

My generation grew up in the political and social environment that followed 2001. It was a generation committed to the media, universities, women’s rights, civil society, elections, criticism of power, and the intellectual struggle against the Taliban. These convictions took shape in an environment in which media discourse and the official positions of international institutions and governments present in Afghanistan emphasized them.

Within this environment, preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a “terrorist sanctuary” was among the principal justifications advanced to legitimize the international presence and intervention.

Then, in Doha, the same world that had spoken of the Republic and its values witnessed negotiations and an agreement between the United States and the Taliban—a group it had itself designated as terrorist—concerning withdrawal. The agreement of February 29, 2020, brought this group to the official negotiating table of the world’s leading power and handed over the future of the Republic, to which millions of Afghan citizens were attached, as part of a transaction concerning withdrawal.

France was not a direct signatory to this agreement. However, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it voted in favour of the Council resolution that incorporated the Doha Agreement into its official annex and welcomed the measures arising from it.

France was also part of the Western political family that, for twenty years, had spoken in Afghanistan of a future that the Doha Agreement hollowed out from within. In Afghanistan, the Western world had not limited itself to military operations: it had also produced meaning and representations. Yet an actor that is also a producer of meaning cannot declare itself neutral after the collapse.

August 15, 2021: The Collapse of a Country and the Destruction of a Life

For the world, August 15, 2021, may amount to little more than images of chaos at Kabul airport and the rapid collapse of a political system. But for me, this date signifies the destruction of the entire world in which my identity, professional life, human connections, and social existence had been built.

On that day, beyond the collapse of a state, I lost an entire living environment, a system of human relationships, the possibility of returning home, and my family’s security: an entire world to which my life was connected and through which it acquired meaning.

As a recognized journalist, I lost, within a short period of time, the fruits of many years of professional activity, my social reputation, and the position I had defended in the public sphere. My network of human and professional relationships, my place in society, my everyday language, and my career prospects were all shattered in the context of a collapse whose consequences went far beyond a mere change of residence.

For me, exile constituted a forced rupture with the historical, cultural, and human context that formed an inseparable part of my being.

In this regard, one of the bitterest aspects of exile lies in a widespread conception that presents it as a privilege granted to those who have fled their country, as though receiving protection from another state meant being freed from suffering and gaining access to tranquillity.

This representation conceals the true nature of exile. In our experience, asylum is neither a privilege nor a choice, nor access to a desirable opportunity. It is an imposed condition and the inevitable consequence of policies and interventions to which these same powers contributed as actors in shaping and prolonging the Afghan crisis. Today, the people of this country are compelled to pay its human cost by leaving their homeland and living in exile.

In other words, we did not leave our homes by choice: we were forced to do so by the policies that determined our country’s destiny, and we had to go and live on other people’s lands. What host countries describe in their official language as the “granting of international protection” takes on, in our lived experience, the meaning of forced exile, a rupture with our social and professional relationships, deprivation of participation in public life, and the suspension of any prospect of rebuilding our existence in our homeland.

Crossing territorial borders does not, in any way, mean escaping the consequences of a collapse. Even after finding refuge in a safe territory, an asylum seeker continues to face the political, social, and human consequences of the collapse that forced them to leave their country.

Persistent anxiety over the safety of family members and loved ones who remain in their country of origin or in third countries, the loss of one’s place and role in society, and the suspension of any possibility of rebuilding one’s life in one’s homeland constitute lasting dimensions of the condition of exile.

From this perspective, asylum does not mean that the crisis has come to an end, but that its consequences have been transferred into another condition of deprivation and instability.

The Migration of Afghan Citizens: A Choice That Is No Choice

Afghan migrants do not leave their country in search of an easier life. The word “choice” is, in itself, inappropriate and misplaced when referring to such a compulsion. They are torn away from their homeland so as not to become victims of the same fundamentalism that emerged from the organized anti-Soviet war, the networks of religious schools strengthened and financed within the geopolitical balances of the Cold War, and the ruthless calculations of the powers involved.

Exile may distance a human being from their native land, but it does not erase their ties to history, collective memory, and the human relationships in which their identity and life were formed.

A person in exile may learn the language of the host society, find a new place within its social and professional structures, and rebuild their existence. But none of these transformations eliminates their attachment to their homeland or their concern for the fate of its inhabitants.

Living in exile does not mean severing ties with the past; it means continuing one’s life under conditions in which a person’s fundamental connections to their territory and society remain intact, even as the possibility of living alongside them has been taken away.

Regardless of a person’s public recognition, career, or experience, exile protects no one from the erosion caused by the absence of a future and the prolongation of a state of suspension. Under such conditions, this suspension prolongs the imposed situation and the suffering inflicted on one’s compatriots.

I recall the famous speech by the American economist Jeffrey Sachs, in which he states that refugees do not come from Syria, Afghanistan, or another political territory: they come from war. A war that, according to him, was initiated by his own country, the United States; by the CIA; and by the policy that, beginning in 1979, was pursued with the aim of overthrowing the Afghan government and kept the United States involved in a war in Afghanistan, openly or covertly, for nearly forty years.

He then cites Iraq as another example of a war that violated international law, lacked justification, and ranks among the most catastrophic decisions in contemporary foreign policy. A war that killed hundreds of thousands of people and forced millions of others to flee and seek refuge.

His question to Europe is equally unequivocal: “Where was European foreign policy? If Europe’s only policy consists of asking whether or not asylum seekers should be accepted, that is not a policy. A genuine policy consists of ending the wars that produce refugees.”

The Right to Asylum: A Human Being Cannot Be Measured by Their “Added Value”

According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is any person who, being outside the country of their nationality, has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, and who is unable or unwilling to seek the protection of that country.

French law is based on the same principle. Refugee status is granted in cases of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group—including considerations related to gender—or political opinion.

None of these grounds makes the right to asylum conditional upon the existence of widespread war or an armed conflict between two states. Thus, even when the intensity of armed clashes in a country decreases, organized persecution, political repression, and the systematic deprivation of fundamental rights may still justify international protection.

The situation of Afghan women and girls constitutes a clear illustration of this reality. Through a series of decrees, restrictions, and exclusionary measures, the Taliban restrict women’s access to education, employment, freedom of movement and expression, healthcare services, and justice.

In its 2026 assessment, the European Union Agency for Asylum explicitly states that the cumulative effect of these discriminatory measures, taken as a whole, reaches the threshold of “persecution.” This assessment also mentions the arrest warrants issued in July 2025 by the International Criminal Court against the Taliban’s supreme leader and the de facto president of their Supreme Court, following accusations of crimes against humanity in the form of gender-based persecution targeting Afghan women and girls.

In its statement of August 15, 2026, marking the fifth anniversary of the fall of Kabul, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs also described the situation in Afghanistan as a profound humanitarian, economic, and security crisis. It specified that women and girls were deprived of secondary and higher education and faced a system of “gender-based repression and oppression.”

In the face of such a reality, statements by figures such as Jordan Bardella concerning the absence of war in Afghanistan reduce the legal criteria governing asylum to an erroneous conception of military conflict.

In asylum law, the criterion is not limited to the existence of an armed conflict. The question is whether a person is exposed to persecution and prosecution, and whether they can benefit from effective protection in their country of origin. From this perspective, the situation in Afghanistan cannot be separated from the reality of the repression and oppression prevailing there simply by denying that it is a “country at war.”

In the same October 2023 interview, Bardella stated that he saw no “added value” for French society in accepting Afghan migrants. This expression, in itself, reveals the moral conception underlying his perspective: a person fleeing persecution, discrimination, and deprivation must first demonstrate the usefulness of their presence to the host society before even being recognized as a holder of rights.

This logic reduces human dignity to a criterion of utility. Yet asylum is not a commercial contract; it is not a privilege granted according to a person’s level of economic productivity, cultural proximity, or compatibility with a political party’s preferences. The right to asylum acquires its very meaning precisely when a person is deprived, in their own country, of protection, security, and the possibility of enjoying their fundamental rights.

It is also important here to take into account the political position from which Bardella’s statements are made. He is president of the National Rally, a party that, under the political leadership of Marine Le Pen and subsequently Bardella, has made severe restrictions on immigration one of the fundamental pillars of its political programme.

The discourse of this political movement repeatedly presents migration as a threat to the security, identity, and cohesion of French society. In his official statement on the European Pact on Migration and Asylum in April 2024, Bardella also used the expression “migratory submersion” or “migratory wave.” This is a formulation that portrays migrants as a threatening mass.

When such language is used about migrants, the victim of war and authoritarianism ceases to be regarded as a person endowed with rights and becomes an element of a collective threat. Within this discursive framework, the Afghan woman fleeing a repressive system is reduced to a member of a population whose presence must be assessed according to the political interests and losses it might entail.

Jordan Bardella, whose academic background has been the subject of debate in French political and public life, also adopts categorical positions on matters such as asylum law—a field in which any position requires, at the very least, knowledge of international legal frameworks, national legislation, and the political and social realities of countries of origin.

In the case of such statements, the significance of this issue lies above all in the gap between the political authority of a party leader and the requirements of legal knowledge and competence that apply when pronouncing on the rights and fate of vulnerable people.

That is why political positions in this field must be assessed against the criteria of the Geneva Convention, French law, and documented evidence concerning the situation in countries of origin, rather than on the basis of personal judgments about the economic usefulness or cultural compatibility of asylum seekers.

Such positions raise a question: how can political figures who present themselves as the “defenders of France’s values and future” adopt such language towards people who have fled a repressive system?

When a woman flees the Taliban, when a young girl sees her future buried under their regime, when a journalist is deprived of a homeland because of his voice, and when their families remain trapped in exile and uncertainty, this situation becomes a test of conscience for the countries that, for years, spoke in Afghanistan of freedom, women’s rights, the media, the Republic, and civil society.

France, a country whose history, through cases such as that of Alfred Dreyfus, has demonstrated how identity-based prejudice and judgments influenced by political considerations can undermine individual rights and the principles of justice, must also base its treatment of asylum seekers on facts, legal standards, and guarantees of justice, rather than on identity-based stereotypes and political judgments concerning immigration.

The Dreyfus Affair remains, for the French Republic, a reminder of this historical truth: justice cannot be subordinated to the demands of politics and the prejudices of an era.

Final Words: Historical Reckoning and Political Responsibility

The question I have pursued in this article is not simply how Afghan asylum seekers should be received in France. It concerns the historical connection that is refused recognition between the policies that determined Afghanistan’s destiny and the populations that are now compelled to pay their human cost in exile.

One cannot remember history when making decisions about a country’s destiny, only to exclude that same history from political considerations when confronted with the inhabitants of that country. One cannot speak of yesterday’s Afghanistan as a strategic theatre and regard today’s Afghan citizen as someone with no connection to that history, reduced to the mere status of an “applicant for entry into Europe.”

The Afghan asylum seeker is not in the position of someone demanding a privilege, but rather that of a human being who has lost the possibility of living safely in their own country. Their right to protection does not depend on the usefulness they might offer to the host society, and human dignity cannot be subjected to economic, cultural, or electoral considerations.

That is why, beyond the manner in which France treats asylum seekers, the question of the foreign policy it pursues towards conflicts that lead to war and population displacement must also be raised. At the same time, the relationship between France’s legal and humanitarian commitments and the way it treats people whom war, repression, and collapse have forced to leave their homeland and seek international protection is itself a fundamental issue in assessing the responsibility of this country.

I write this article as a testimony to a history that must not be erased from Europe’s political memory; a history in which the decisions of powerful states overturned the destiny of the inhabitants of a country, while the ultimate cost remained the responsibility of those very inhabitants.

This is not about demanding forgiveness or a privilege, but about securing recognition of responsibilities, preserving historical memory, and defending the rights of human beings whose voices have repeatedly been ignored in the balance of power.

In his famous defence of Dreyfus, Émile Zola wrote: “I have but one passion, that of enlightenment, in the name of a humanity that has suffered so much and that has a right to happiness.”

For my part, this article is likewise an attempt to shed light on the responsibility of states that contributed to shaping Afghanistan’s destiny and to criticize power relations in which the victims of yesterday’s policies are still reduced, today, to objects of political bargaining in calculations of power, migration considerations, and electoral rivalries.

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