Francis Fukuyama, a political science theorist, writes in his latest piece published in the U.S. magazine Persuasion that there is no such thing as a “Trump doctrine,” and that U.S. behavior is explained not by a set of principles or priorities, but by the “personal interests and preoccupations” of the president.
He writes that Trump’s mind is “full of resentments, anger, anecdotes, made-up facts, things he heard on Fox News, and outright lies that he has convinced himself are true.”
Fukuyama adds that foreign policy doctrines are essential for guiding and coordinating institutions such as the State Department, the military, and the intelligence community, but at present these institutions are not functioning properly.
He writes that they are led by “sycophants” such as Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, whose main motivation is “to stay on Trump’s good side.” He also describes U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as a “clownish bully” with psychological problems, and points to Trump’s reliance on figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who, in his view, lack the necessary expertise and standing.
Referring to Venezuela, Fukuyama writes that the “successful” operation against Nicolás Maduro led Trump to believe he possessed an extraordinary military tool that he could use at low cost and even be praised for it. This contributed to what he describes as a growing sense of confidence in Trump. After Venezuela, when asked whether there were limits to his international actions, Trump replied that the only thing that could stop him was “my morality.”
Fukuyama adds that Netanyahu appears to have convinced Trump that Iran would be similar to Venezuela and that its regime would collapse quickly after initial strikes. By that time, Trump had developed strong confidence in his own instincts; when recently asked when the war would end, he said he would “feel it in my bones.”
Fukuyama argues that the attempt to extract a coherent doctrine from statements and events is a common assumption among foreign policy analysts, but in this case no such doctrine exists. According to him, even the National Security Strategy document prepared for Trump’s second term bears no relation to the administration’s actual foreign policy.
He writes that the document emphasized focusing on the Western Hemisphere and reducing the importance of Europe, and mentioned the Middle East only to suggest that previous levels of focus were no longer necessary. Iran is mentioned only twice, and its nuclear program is not presented as a threat to the United States.
He adds that while the document stresses narrowing the definition of U.S. vital interests, subsequent actions by the administration did not align with this framework.
Fukuyama argues that Iran does not currently pose a direct threat to the United States and is unlikely to do so in the future, though it may be considered a threat to Israel. However, treating Israel’s security as vital to that of the United States, he says, reflects the same kind of “mission inflation” criticized in the strategy document.
He notes that at the beginning of his second term, Trump showed a degree of restraint in foreign policy and initially warned Israel’s prime minister against attacking Iran. However, after Israel carried out the attack, an opportunity for a rapid operation emerged that Trump could not resist.
Fukuyama writes that members of Congress, journalists, and foreign leaders will never receive a clear answer about the administration’s goals, because those goals are essentially whatever Trump believes will strengthen his political position or enrich himself and his family.
He concludes that the current situation means there is no doctrine in place and therefore “no current basis for any kind of world order.”
He emphasizes: “It’s not a good thing when the world’s most powerful country is guided not by clear ideas, but by the personal needs of a single leader.”
