The recent mass detention of women by Taliban forces in Kabul has once again raised a critical question: can such actions—carried out without judicial warrants, without formal complaints, and without any specified charge—claim legitimacy under Islamic law?
Sunni jurisprudence, which the Taliban claim to follow, provides a detailed and balanced framework of personal, social, and governmental rulings in which human dignity, the sanctity of life, and adherence to justice form the core. Within this framework, none of the four Sunni legal schools permit the detention of any individual—woman or man—without an official summons, proven wrongdoing in a competent court, the opportunity for self-defense, and the presence of a qualified judge. The detention of women by bodies that are military or administrative in nature and lack judicial legitimacy is, regardless of intention, a clear instance of injustice in Islamic jurisprudence.
According to Hanafi law, the foundational principle in dealing with Muslims is barā’at al-dhimma—the presumption of innocence. Every individual is considered innocent until proven otherwise. This principle is central to Islamic judicial procedure, and no action may be taken without its observance. Even when there is serious doubt regarding an individual’s conduct, the stages of formal summons, judicial inquiry, the right to defense, and the issuance of a formal ruling are indispensable before any executive action. These principles are explicit in the works of classical jurists such as Imām Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and Al-Shāfiʿī.
In the recent Kabul incident, none of these procedures were followed. Reports from families indicate that women were detained solely for appearing in public or for walking without a male guardian. Yet neither of these circumstances constitutes grounds for detention in any authoritative Islamic legal source. Even the question of hijab—which the Taliban frequently invoke—does not justify such actions. The consensus of Sunni jurists holds that the religious obligation relates to general modest dress, not to specific styles or forms. In most of these cases, the detained women observed full Islamic dress, making it clear that the actions taken against them were based not on violations of religious law but on the Taliban’s own notion of “social order.” And in Islamic jurisprudence, “social order” without a fiqh-based foundation cannot be used to restrict lawful freedoms.
Islamic teachings on enjoining good and forbidding wrong (amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa nahy ʿan al-munkar) also require conditions, procedures, and ethical standards. First, the wrongdoing must be certain, not based on suspicion or personal preference. Second, moral admonition must precede any punitive measure. Third, the responsibility cannot be entrusted to individuals lacking religious knowledge or moral qualification. When armed men, without legal jurisdiction or judicial orders, detain groups of women, they step far outside the bounds of Islamic ethics. In fact, by violating human dignity, instilling fear, and committing injustice, they themselves enter the realm of “munkar.”
One of the central teachings of the Qur’an—highlighted repeatedly in Sunni commentaries—is that no community may be held accountable for crimes they have not committed. Islamic law stipulates that individuals may only be punished when their wrongdoing is proven by clear evidence in a legitimate court. This principle safeguards human dignity and prevents the abuse of power. Any deprivation of liberty without judicial process—whether imposed by an Islamic ruler or an administrative body—is explicitly a transgression against Islamic law and a form of oppression.
Furthermore, in Islamic jurisprudence, women possess full legal capacity and independence, just like men. Based on foundational sources, a Muslim woman cannot be restricted from movement, education, commerce, or public presence unless convicted in a fair judicial process. Even the classical recommendation for a guardian in long-distance travel is not a legally binding condition for walking within a city or engaging in daily activities. The failure to distinguish between “fiqh rulings” and “political enforcement” is one reason the Taliban’s policies appear less like applications of Islamic law and more like exercises of absolute rule.
For these reasons, the recent detentions have no legitimacy under Sunni jurisprudence. Presumption of innocence is fundamental, the right to self-defense is guaranteed, and punishment without a judge and proper court is rejected by all Sunni legal schools.
If the Taliban claim adherence to Islamic law, they must first acknowledge the essential distinction between religious rulings and political decisions. They cannot impose personal preference, fear, or ideological rigidity in the name of Islam when the entire body of jurisprudence stands against them. Otherwise, they not only distort the law but also deepen public mistrust in religion—an outcome far more damaging than any political misstep.
The opinions presented here belong solely to the authors and do not represent Deeyar’s editorial stance.
